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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Juan Luis Sanchez-Castro appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine
and trafficking in methamphetamine. Sanchez-Castro claims, for the first time on
appeal that, under the plain language of I.C. § 37-27328 and "principles of
double jeopardy," he could not legally be convicted and sentenced for both
offenses. The Idaho Supreme Court should retain this case to decide whether
(1) the plain language of I.C. § 37-27328 evidences a legislative intent to create
an exception to the general rule that allows for conviction and sentence of
conspiracy and the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy, and
(2) trafficking is a lesser included offense of conspiracy to traffic.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Sanchez-Castro for conspiracy to traffic in
methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.21-24.) A jury
found Sanchez-Castro guilty of both counts.

(R., pp.149-150.)

The court

imposed a unified 15-year sentence with 10 years fixed on the conspiracy charge
and a concurrent unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed on the trafficking
charge. (R., pp.164-167.) The district court also imposed fines and court costs
on both counts.

(R., pp.166-167.)

Sanchez-Castro filed a timely notice of

appeal. (R., pp.178-181.)
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ISSUE
Sanchez-Castro states the issue on appeal as:
Under the plain language of Idaho Code § 37 -2732B and principles
of double jeopardy, can a defendant be convicted and sentenced
for both a conspiracy under subsection (b) and the completed act
under subsection (a) when both charges arise out of the same
course of conduct?
(Appellant's Brief, p.2.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Sanchez-Castro failed to demonstrate fundamental error based on his claim
that he could not be convicted and sentenced for both conspiracy to traffic in
methamphetamine
and
the
substantive
offense
of trafficking
in
methamphetamine since that claim is contrary to both the plain language of I.C. §
37-2732B and precedents of the United States Supreme Court that allow for the
conviction and sentence of both conspiracy to traffic and the substantive offense
of trafficking?
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ARGUMENT
Sanchez-Castro Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Based On His
Double Jeopardy Claim
A.

Introduction
Sanchez-Castro contends, for the first time on appeal, that "his convictions

and sentences" for both conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine and trafficking
in methamphetamine under I.C. § 37-2732B(a) and (b) "cannot stand because
the plain language of the statute, and the principles of double jeopardy, does not
allow for such a result." (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) Sanchez-Castro's claim fails.
Neither the statute nor the Double Jeopardy Clause preclude separate
convictions and sentences for both conspiracy and the substantive offense that is
the object of the conspiracy.

Sanchez-Castro has therefore failed to establish

error, much less fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).

3

The

interpretation and application of a statute is also a question of law subject to de
novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943,946,265 P.3d 1155,1158 (Ct. App.
2011 ).

C.

Sanchez-Castro Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Relation To
His Double Jeopardy Claim
Sanchez-Castro contends his convictions for both conspiracy to traffic in

methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine "cannot stand" because,
he contends that, under the plain language of I.C. § 37-2732B, he "cannot be
punished for both the completed offense identified in subsection (a) of the statute
and conspiracy to commit the completed offense."

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

Sanchez-Castro also argues that, based on the allegations in the Indictment, the
substantive offense was a lesser included offense of the conspiracy charge.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) Sanchez-Castro raises his claims for the first time on
appeal. As such, it is his burden to establish the error he alleges is fundamental.
To meet this burden, Sanchez-Castro must demonstrate a constitutional violation
that is both clear from the record and "substantial . . . meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." State
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). For the reasons set
forth below, Sanchez-Castro has failed to meet his burden of establishing a clear
constitutional violation and, as such, he has failed to show entitlement to
appellate review, much less reversal.
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1.

The Plain Language Of I. C. § 37 -2732B Does Not Preclude
Prosecution For Both Conspiracy And The Substantive Offense
That Is The Object Of The Conspiracy

Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(4) provides that "[a]ny person who knowingly
delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive
possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more of methamphetamine or
amphetamine or of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine

or

amphetamine

is

guilty

of

.

.

trafficking

in

methamphetamine or amphetamine." Idaho Code § 37-2732B(b) states: "Any
person who agrees, conspires, combines or confederates with another person or
solicits another person to commit any act prohibited in subsection (a) of this
section is guilty of a felony and is punishable as if he had actually committed
such prohibited act."
A plain reading of Idaho Code § 37-2732B does not support SanchezCastro's claim that the statute precludes punishment "for both the completed
offense identified in subsection (a) of the statute and conspiracy to commit the
completed offense." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Subsection (b) makes it a felony,
i.e., a separate crime, for a person to agree, conspire, combine, or solicit another

person to commit trafficking and imposes the same punishment for such conduct
as someone found guilty of the substantive offense.

Subsection (a)(4) on the

other hand makes it a felony to complete the crime of trafficking, i.e., to "deliver,
bring[] into this state, or" to knowingly possess methamphetamine in excess of a
specified quantity. Sanchez-Castro's claim that I.C. § 37-2732B itself precludes

5

punishment for both trafficking and conspiracy to traffic is unsupported by the
plain language of the statute.

2.

Separate Convictions And Sentences For Conspiracy To Traffic
And The Completed Crime Of Trafficking Do Not Violate Double
Jeopardy
a.

Sanchez-Castro's Double Jeopardy Argument Is Contrary To
United States Supreme Court Precedent

Sanchez-Castro also argues that trafficking is a lesser included offense of
conspiracy to traffic and, as such, he cannot be punished for both offenses.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) In support of this argument, Sanchez-Castro relies on
'''the indictment or pleading theory' which 'expands the traditional statutory theory
of a lesser included offense for the purpose of determining whether there is
double jeopardy. '" '(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6 (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho
,
742,756, 810 P.2d 680 (1991).) To the extent Sanchez-Castro's claim is based
on the Fifth Amendment, his reliance on the pleading theory is misplaced
because the United States Supreme Court has not adopted any pleading theory
for double jeopardy and has instead specifically found double jeopardy is not
violated when a defendant is convicted and sentenced for both a conspiracy and
the substantive crime that the was the object of the conspiracy.
In Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975), the United States
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]raditionally the law has considered conspiracy
and the completed substantive offense to be separate crimes. Conspiracy is an
inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful
act." (Citations omitted.) The Court in Iannelli further noted that, "[u]nlike some

6

crimes that arise in a single transaction, the conspiracy to commit an offense and
the subsequent commission of that crime normally do not merge into a single
punishable act."

~

"Thus, it is well recognized that in most cases separate

sentences can be imposed for the conspiracy to do an act and for the
subsequent accomplishment of that end."

~

at 777-778; see also United States

v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 392 (1992) (recognizing "the established doctrine that a
conspiracy to commit a crime is a separate offense from the crime itself');
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) ("It has been long and
consistently recognized by the Court that the commission of the substantive
offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses. The
power of Congress to separate the two and to affix to each a different penalty is
well established."). "Indeed, [the United States Supreme Court] has even held
that the conspiracy can be punished more harshly than the accomplishment of its
purpose."

~

at 778.

The rationale for the distinction between the crime of

conspiracy and the crime that it is the object of the conspiracy is "that a
conspiracy poses distinct dangers quite apart from those of the substantive
offense."

~;

see also Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 643-644 (citations omitted) ("the

plea of double jeopardy is no defense to conviction for both offenses" because it
"is only an identity of offenses which is fatal"; "conspiracy is a partnership in
crime" and "has ingredients, as well as implications, distinct from the completion
of the unlawful act").
The only exception to the general principle stated in Iannelli is the socalled "Wharton Rule."

"The Rule traces its origin to the decision of the
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850),
a case in which the court ordered dismissal of an indictment alleging conspiracy
to commit adultery that was brought after the State had failed to obtain
convictions for the substantive offense." Iannelli at 779. "Prominent among the
concerns voiced in the Shannon opinion is the possibility that the State could
force the defendant to undergo subsequent prosecution for a lesser offense after
failing to prove the greater."

19.:.

The holding in Shannon "reflects this concern,

stating that 'where concert is a constituent part of the act to be done, as it is in
fornication and adultery, a party acquitted of the major cannot be indicted of the
minor." Iannelli at 779 (quoting Shannon at 227-228). Notably, "Wharton's Rule
first emerged at a time when the contours of the law of conspiracy were in the
process of active formation" and H[t]he general question whether the conspiracy
merged into the completed felony offense remained for some time a matter of
uncertain resolution."

19.:.

at 781. Although "[t]hat issue is now settled ... the

Rule currently stands as an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy
and the substantive offense that is its immediate end do not merge upon proof
the latter."

19.:. at 781-782.

However, the Wharton Rule "does not rest on principles of double
jeopardy.

Instead, it has current vitality only as a judicial presumption, to be

applied in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary." Iannelli, 420 U.S. at
782 (citations omitted).

In this sense, "[t]he test articulated in Blockburger1

...

serves a generally similar function of identifying congressional intent to impose

1

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or
transaction."

!.sL at 785 n.17. In other words, the purpose of the Wharton Rule,

like the Blockburger test, is to ascertain whether the legislature intended two
offenses to merge upon conviction for both or whether the legislature intended
the offenses to be prosecuted and sentenced separately.

See Pinkerton, 328

U.S. at 643 (identifying the "instances where a conspiracy charge may not be
added to the substantive charge" as those "where the agreement of two persons
is necessary for the completion of the substantive crime and there is no
ingredient in the conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime" and
"where the definition of the substantive offense excludes from punishment for
conspiracy one who voluntarily participates in another's crime").
In State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 567, 682 P.2d 105, 108 (Ct. App.
1984), the Court of Appeals, citing Iannelli, recognized the basic principle that "[ilt
is generally accepted that a conviction and sentence on a count charging
conspiracy will not, on the theory of double punishment, prevent conviction and
sentence on another count charging the substantive offense." And, as stated by
the United States Supreme Court:
[I]t is not material that overt acts charged in the conspiracy counts
were also charged and proved as substantive offenses. If the overt
act be the offense which was the object of the conspiracy, and is
also punished, there is not a double punishment of it. The
agreement to do an unlawful act is even then distinct from the doing
of the act.
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644 (quotations and citation omitted).
A review of the elements of trafficking in methamphetamine and
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine reveals neither is an included offense
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of the other under the Blockburger test.

(Compare ICJI 1101 with ICJI 4060;

compare Trial Tr., p.508, L16 - p.512, L9 with p.512, L10 - p.515, L14.) It is
unclear whether Sanchez-Castro contends otherwise as he does not cite
Blockburger, much less apply it to the statutory provisions charged in this case.
To the extent Sanchez-Castro's statutory "plain language" argument is intended
as a Blockburger analysis, for the reasons already stated, the statute does not
support his claim.
Because Sanchez-Castro's argument is directly contrary to applicable
Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent, he has failed to show
error, much less fundamental error.

b.

The Pleading Theory Advocated By Sanchez-Castro Is
Incompatible With Supreme Court Precedent

If Sanchez-Castro's lesser included argument is based on the "pleading
theory," which appears to be the case, his claim still fails.

Under the federal

constitution, if a statutory analysis survives the Blockburger test, there can be no
double jeopardy violation. United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985). To
thereafter apply the "pleading theory" of double jeopardy is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent and

essentially

converts

a test of statutory

construction under Blockburger into one of prosecutorial intent.

Such a

departure is unwarranted and the consequences of applying such a theory to a
double jeopardy claim

in the context of a case like Sanchez-Castro's
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demonstrates why a pleading theory should be rejected as a viable double
jeopardyanalysis. 2
In State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 373, 256 P.3d 776, 781 (Ct. App.
2011), the Court of Appeals stated that its "review of Idaho Supreme Court
precedent demonstrates that the Court has not been entirely consistent in its
application of either the Blockburger test or the pleading theory in double
jeopardy cases."

The Court of Appeals specifically noted a lack of clarity in

determining which theory applied to federal constitutional claims as opposed to
claims based on the Idaho Constitution.

kL

at 370-375, 256 P.3d at 778-783.

Although the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Flegel, which was issued six
Corbus, recognized both the statutory Blockburger theory and the
pleading theory, it did so in the context of determining subject matter jurisdiction
and the right to presentment and indictment of a grand jury or commitment by a
magistrate, not in the context of double jeopardy. See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530,
261 P.3d at 524 (identifying issue as whether "a violation of 18-1506(1)(b) was
an included offense of the indictment charging a violation of section 18-1508
under either the statutory or pleading theory, precluding the need for" an
indictment or commitment as required by the Idaho Constitution).
The ambiguity recognized in Corbus was also not squarely addressed in
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 291 P.3d 1036 (2013) which, unlike Flegel,
did involve a double jeopardy claim. The Court in McKinney considered whether

The state does not dispute that the "pleading theory" is a viable due process
analysis for determining what lesser-included offenses are charged in a single
count. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529, 261 P.3d 519, 523 (2011).

2
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the defendant could be "properly sentenced for both murder and robbery." 153
Idaho at 841, 291 P.3d at 1040. The Court began with the proposition that under
"both the federal and Idaho double jeopardy clauses, a defendant may not be
convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense."
citation omitted).

~

(quotations and

The Court initially stated Idaho has "adopted" the pleading

theory, but it applied both the "federal strict elements theory" and "Idaho's
pleading theory" to McKinney's claim, ultimately concluding the "crimes of
premeditated murder and robbery each require proof of separate elements,"
thereby surviving Blockburger, and that "the Information in [that] case alleged
premeditation and felony murder as two separate bases for McKinney's firstdegree murder charge" for which the "jury separately found him guilty," thereby
surviving a pleading theory analysis.

~

The pleading theory of double jeopardy appears to have its genesis in
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980). McKinney, 153 Idaho
at 841,291 P.3d at 1040 (citing Thompson). At issue in Thompson was "whether
the charge of assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser included offense in a
charge of attempted robbery, as alleged herein, such as to preclude conviction
under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution."

~

at 433, 614 P.2d at 973.

With

respect to the Fifth Amendment, the Court, quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977), stated: "It has long been understood that separate statutory crimes need
not be identical either in constituent elements or in actual proof in order to be the
same within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition." Thompson, 101 Idaho
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at 433, 614 P.2d at 973. The Court then noted that "[m]any jurisdictions have
expanded the definition of lesser included offenses beyond the statutory theory
and utilize what is called the 'indictment' or 'pleading' theory," and stated, "Idaho
has adopted this pleading approach both by statute and by case law."

~

at 433-

434,614 P.2d at 973-974 (citing I.C. § 19-2312 and cases).
To the extent the Court in Thompson used Brown as a platform for
applying a test different than or in addition to Blockburger, it must be noted that
the United States Supreme Court, in fact, applied the Blockburger statutory
analysis in Brown in concluding that joyriding was a "lesser included offense" of
auto theft because it was "clearly not the case that each statute requires proof of
a fact which the other does not."

432 U.S. at 167 (citation and quotations

omitted). The Court, consistent with Blockburger, also acknowledged the result
would have been different had the state legislature "provided that joyriding is a
separate offense for each day in which a motor vehicle is operated without the
owner's consent."

~

at 169 n. 8.

Th us, Brown does not support a broader

pleading theory analysis under the Fifth Amendment.
In addition, the Court in Thompson did not articulate any particular reason
why the state constitutional protection against double jeopardy in Idaho would be
greater than that found under the federal constitution.

Rather, the Court in

Thompson simply noted that Idaho "has adopted [a] pleading approach both by
statute and by case law."

101 Idaho at 433-434, 614 P.2d at 973-974.

The

statute to which the Court referred is I.C. § 19-2312, which reads: 'The jury may
find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily
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included in that with which he is charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to
commit the offense." This statute does not support a "pleading theory" of double
jeopardy.

The "pleading theory" is only relevant to this statute because due

process requires a defendant to have notice of the charges for which he may
face conviction, and the defendant is deemed to have notice of an included
offense that is "alleged in the information or indictment as a means or element of
the commission of the higher offense." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529, 261 P.3d at
523. This does not, however, mean that an independent charge alleged in the
pleading automatically becomes an "included offense" of a separate charge
simply because the charges are related.

Rather, the pleading theory itself

requires the "included offense" to be alleged as "a means or element of the
higher offense."

&

When viewed that way, Blockburger and the "pleading

theory" can be easily reconciled. If the legislature, by statute, incorporates the
elements of one offense into another offense, that is a clear reflection of the
legislature's intent that the crimes shall not be punished separately.

Felony-

murder is a perfect example of this.
Idaho Code § 18-4003(d) states, in relevant part: "Any murder committed
in the perpetration ·of, or attempt to perpetrate, aggravated battery on a child
under twelve (12) years of age, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or
mayhem ... , is murder of the first degree." This offense is generally referred to
as "felony-murder" because, in order to prove first-degree murder under that
particular provision, the plain language of the statute requires the state to also
prove an enumerated felony.

The elements of whatever felony is alleged are

14

thereby incorporated into the murder charge. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731
P.2d 192 (1986), illustrates this point.
The state charged Sivak with felony-murder and robbery and he was
convicted of both.

Sivak, 112 Idaho at 210-211, 731 P .2d at 205-206.

On

appeal, Sivak claimed a violation of I.C. § 18-301 and a double jeopardy violation
under the United States Constitution. The Court held that under the "statutory"
theory, robbery was not an included offense of felony-murder because "a person
does not necessarily have to commit robbery to be convicted of felony murder.
The other enumerated felonies are available and, therefore, one need not always
be required to commit robbery to get convicted of felony murder." Sivak, 112
Idaho at 211, 731 P.2d at 206 (emphasis original). The Court, however, went on
to apply the "pleading theory" and held:
[I]t is clear that all the elements needed to sustain a conviction of
robbery were also within the elements needed to sustain a
conviction of felony murder. Thus, under these circumstances,
robbery is a lesser included offense of felony-murder and,
therefore, the robbery conviction merges as a lesser included
offense of the felony murder conviction.
Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211, 731 P.2d at 206.
After concluding that robbery was a lesser included offense of felonymurder "under the[ ] circumstances" of the case, the Court went on to state its
conclusion did "not go unsupported," citing and quoting Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684 (1984), where the United States Supreme Court held that a "rape
conviction merged with a felony murder conviction because '[a] conviction for
killing in the course of rape cannot be had without proving all of the elements of
the offense of rape.'"

Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211, 731 P.2d at 206.
15

Then, in a

footnote, the Court recognized that the Supreme Court in Whalen applied
Blockburger and concluded Blockburger would also compel the same conclusion
it reached under the pleading theory, i.e., robbery was included within the felony
murder charge. Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211 n.S, 731 P.2d at 206 n.S. This footnote
in Sivak suggests the Court found a distinction between the "statutory" theory
and Blockburger, the basis of which is unclear.3 Regardless of any perceived
distinction between the statutory theory the Court applied in Sivak and the
Blockburger test, the important point is that the Court reached the same
conclusion under its application of the pleading theory as it did when applying
Blockburger and, in fact, the Court offered the Blockburger analysis to support its
"pleading theory" result. That the Court reached the same conclusion under both
tests is no accident because Blockburger,

although a test of statutory

interpretation, does not require complete disregard of the pleading in cases
involving statutes like the felony murder statute.

See,~,

Whalen, supra.

In

other words, Blockburger is entirely adequate to resolve any double jeopardy
concern that may legitimately arise from how the charges are pled such that
there is no reason to conduct a secondary "pleading theory" analysis once
Blockburger is satisfied, and the Idaho Supreme Court has never articulated a
constitutional justification for doing so.
As previously noted, the Court in Thompson never expressly held that the
Idaho Constitution affords greater double jeopardy protections than the United

3 It is also unclear why the Court would apply any test other than Blockburger in
analyzing Sivak's claim under the United States Constitution given its recognition
that the Supreme Court utilizes Blockburger.
16

States Constitution.

The only explicit reference in Thompson to the Court's

departure from Blockburger is found in a footnote where the Court states:
"Blockburger sets forth the minimum standards required so that the fifth

amendment prohibition against double jeopardy is not violated.

The[] cases

[relied upon by the state] do not stand for the proposition that only the
Blockburger test is relevant in Idaho." Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 n.5, 614

P.2d at 975 n.5. While the Court in Thompson clearly did not think Blockburger
was the only "relevant" test in Idaho, the articulated basis for the Court's
departure from Blockburger was statutory as reflected in its reliance on I.C. § 192312, which is itself irrelevant to a double jeopardy claim. In fact, using I.C. § 192312 as a source of double jeopardy law is actually inconsistent with the
legislative intent.
Interpreting I. C. § 19-2312 as imposing a "pleading theory" analysis upon
a double jeopardy claim not only interferes with the enforcement of separate
crimes as they have been defined by the legislature, it is inconsistent with
express legislative acts regarding double jeopardy. In addition to relying on I.C.

§ 19-2312, the Court in Thompson also cited I.C. § 18-301, which provided:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by
different provisions of this code may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than
one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars
prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.
Reliance on I.C. § 18-301 for a broader interpretation of double jeopardy
in Thompson was understandable because when that statute was in effect it had
"been held to provide a greater scope of protection than the constraints of double
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jeopardy found in the Idaho and United States Constitutions." State v. Seamons,
126 Idaho 809, 811, 892 P.2d 484, 486 (1995).

The legislature, however,

repealed I.C. § 18-301 in 1995, suggesting it did not intend to afford greater
protections than the state or federal constitutions. 4

As such, any continued

reliance on I.C. § 18-301 as a source of greater state constitutional protection is
no longer valid.
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause allows conviction and
punishment for multiple offenses arising from single acts if the legislature so
intended. A "pleading theory" of double jeopardy is inconsistent with the federal
test to the extent it relies solely on the pleadings of the prosecutor without regard
to legislative intent.

Holding that the Idaho Constitution's double jeopardy

protection is entirely different, and based on a completely different rationale, is
unwarranted where there has been no clear statement that the Idaho Constitution
requires otherwise and no Idaho statute compels a separate "pleading theory"
analysis. The state, therefore, submits that the sole test for determining whether
two separate offenses may be pursued in a single prosecution is the test
articulated in Blockburger. To hold otherwise, particularly in this case, would be
contrary to the well-established principle from lanelli, that was acknowledged in

Idaho Code § 18-301 provided, in pertinent part: "An act or omission which is
made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be
punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under
more than one .. ,," McKinney, 153 Idaho at 842, 291 P.3d at 1041 (quoting I.C.
§ 18-301). Section 18-301 is distinct from the constitutional protection against
being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense in that it provided greater
protection than the constitution by protecting a defendant from double
punishment where two or more crimes arose from the same act or transaction.
State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097,1099,739 P.2d 396,398 (1987).
4
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Gallatin, that a defendant can be convicted and punished for both conspiracy and
the substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy.
Controlling precedent, which Sanchez-Castro does not cite much less
distinguish, forecloses his claim that he may not be convicted and sentenced of
both

conspiracy

to

traffic

in

methamphetamine

and

trafficking

in

methamphetamine. Sanchez-Castro has therefore failed to meet his burden of
showing a clear constitutional violation that would entitle him to relief under the
Perry fundamental error test.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Sanchez-Castro's
convictions and sentences for both conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine and
trafficking in methamphetamine.
DATED this 28th day of January, 2014.
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